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Baldwin and the General Strike
Study the sources and then answer the questions that follow.
Source A:
| The memoirs of J.C.C Davidson, a friend of Baldwin, a Conservative MP and, from 1926, Conservative Party Chairman. It has got to be made absolutely clear, in everything which is written about Baldwin and the General Strike, that his vision and his judgement were clear and decisive, and that he didn’t waffle. The idea was always put about that he was under pressure. But there was no question of pressure; he saw the thing as clear as crystal. The decision he took was that there should be no parley. The Constitution would not be safe until we had won the victory, and victory depended on the surrender of the TUC. Source: R. R. James (ed.) Memoirs of a Conservative, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969. |
Source B:
| The diary of Tom Jones, one of Baldwin’s senior advisers, May 1926. The chief asset in keeping the country steadfast during the negotiations was the Prime Minister’s reputation for fair dealing enhanced later by his sincere plea against malice and vindictiveness. His seeming weakness had been his strength. Had he yielded to the Diehard influences, he would have prolonged the strike by rallying the whole of Labour in defence of Trade Unionism. Source: K. Middlemass (ed.), Whitehall Diary 1916-1930, 3 vols, Oxford, 1969-71. |
Source C:
| Letter from Lord Beaverbook to a friend, 24 May 1926. Beaverbrook was the owner of the Daily Express, a Conservative and a friend of Lloyd George. The praises which are being poured upon Baldwin are pure hysteria. I have worked with him intermittently at one time for ten years at a stretch, and he is a man absolutely without a mind or a capacity to make one up. Source: Quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, Penguin, 1974. |
Source D: Information from a modern historian.
| On the evening of 8 May, Baldwin broadcast to the nation: “I a man of peace, I am longing and working and praying for peace, but I will not surrender the safety and the security of the British Constitution. You placed me in power eighteen months ago by the largest majority given to any party for many years. Have I done anything to forfeit that confidence? Cannot you trust me to ensure a square deal and to secure even justice between man and man?...” On the same day that the General Strike was called off, Baldwin again broadcast to the nation. “Our business is not to triumph over those who have failed in a mistaken attempt”, he said, and he went on to assure his large audience that he would lose no time in resuming negotiations with the miners and owners. He offered to operate the Samuel Report if the two sides would accept it first. However, the miners refused and the stoppage dragged on for the remainder of the year. The miners were eventually forced back to the pits by cold and starvation, being forced to accept longer hours and lower wages. Source: H. M. Hyde: Baldwin – the Unexpected Prime Minister, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973 (adapted extracts). |
Source E:
| Information from another modern historian. ‘Baldwin issued proposals two days after the end of the strike, but they were rejected. Neither side would budge. In July Baldwin gave way to the owners and introduced an Eight Hours Act (increasing the miners’ working day from seven hours to eight), hoping that the owners would offer concessions in return. But the owners had no such intention. Their tactics were to wait until there was a split in the miners’ unity. At the end of November the miners were forced to give in. It was a total defeat.’ Source: M. Morris, The General Strike, Penguin, 1976 (adapted extracts). |
Source F:
| The opinion of Jim Griffiths, a South Wales miners’ leader and later a Labour MP. The failure of the general strike was a tremendous setback to the trade union and Labour Movement: it knocked the bottom out of many men and women who had given their lives to the movement. It began a process of an enforced reduction in all standards of life. Source: quoted in M. Morris, The General Strike, Penguin, 1976. |
Source G:
| The opinion of Bill Ballantyne, a member of the I.L.P. and a committee member of the Carstairs branch of the National Union of Railwaymen. Looking back, I think it would have been better if we’d all gone back together. Maybe the miners would have got better terms than they did in the end. Perhaps if we’d had a better negotiator we might have managed it, but Herbert Smith was determined to stay out. He was a very stubborn man, a strong leader, but no negotiator. Neither was cook. It left such a bitterness behind. Source: as for Source F. |
Source H:
| The opinion of Walter Citrine, a leader of the Electrical Trades Union, member of the TUC General Council in 1926 and later TUC General Secretary and a life peer. I do not regard the General Strike as a failure. It is true that it was ill-prepared and that it was called off without any consultation with those who took part in it … But it demonstrated the potential power of the trade unions. It served as a warning to the government and the employers. It was publicly stated that the trade of the country had lost £400 million and the government about £80 million. Would any government gleefully contemplate a repetition in an effort to teach Labour its proper place … and we had a Labour government in 1929; I’m sure that was a result of it. Source: Lord Citrine, Men and Work, Hutchinson, 1964 (adapted extracts). |
Using the evidence of the sources and your own knowledge, answer the following questions:
