For a reflection by a human rights scholar on why animals should not be excluded from the ambit of human rights, focusing on rights’ function as security against abuse of power, see: Conor Gearty, ‘Can Animals Have “Human Rights” Too?’, available at https://adam1cor.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/animals.pdf
For background on this supplementary perspective, that human rights have arisen predominantly as responses to experiences of oppression, see: Morton Winston, ‘Human Rights as Moral Rebellion and Social Construction’ (2007) 6 Journal of Human Rights 279, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/14754830601098436
Should Only Humans Have Human Rights?
For an argument that distinctively human rights are grounded in humans’ capacity to be responsible for others, and that critics of anthropocentric human rights appeal to this capacity, see: Hannah Bielefeldt, ‘Moving Beyond Anthropocentrism? Human Rights and the Charge of Speciesism’ (2021) 43 Human Rights Quarterly 515, available at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/800981. For a supporting argument that defends ethical humanism, see: Simon Coghlan, ‘Humanism, Anti-Humanism, and Nonhuman Animals’ (2016) 24 Society & Animals 403, available at https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-12341416
For high-level discussions of foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches to human rights, see: Michael Freeman, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 491, available at https://doi.org/10.2307/762434 and David Lefkowitz, ‘International Human Rights Law: Concepts and Grounds of Human Rights’, Philosophy and International Law: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2020), available at https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316481653.007
For an elaboration of a political practice-based approach to international human rights that builds on HLA Hart’s rule of recognition, see: Andre Santos Campos, ‘The Political Conception of Human Rights and Its Rule(s) of Recognition’ (2022) 35 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 95, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2021.23.
For an elaboration of a practice-based approach to international law with a focus on animal interests, see: Katie Sykes, ‘“Nations Like Unto Yourselves”: An Inquiry into the Status of a General Principle of International Law on Animal Welfare’ (2012) 49 Canadian Yearbook of international Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 3, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2221897
For a concise and accessible critique of autonomy-based accounts of human rights, see: David Thunder, ‘Why Respect for Freedom Cannot Explain the Content and Grounds of Human Rights: A Response to Valentini’ (2014) 42 Political Theory 490, available at https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591714531494
For a defence of dignity-based approaches, against political approaches, as necessary to ensure that human rights can be prioritized against the rights claims of other entities (especially corporations), see: Cristina Lafont, ‘Should We Take the “Human” Out of Human Rights? Human Dignity in a Corporate World’ (2016) 30 Ethics & International Affairs 233, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679416000101
For an interesting reflection on the grounds and practice of human rights that focuses on the “subject of human rights,” rather than “human rights,” and discusses the expanding horizon of rights-holders, see: Danielle Celermajer and Alexandre Lefebvre, ‘Bringing the Subject of Human Rights into Focus’ pp 1-10, 14-16, 20-23 in Danielle Celermajer and Alexandre Lefebvre (eds), The Subject of Human Rights (Stanford University Press 2020), available at https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503613720-002
For a reflection on how human rights discourse limits the normative universe to those who are denoted rights-holders, which argues in favour of basing rights on relationships and values, see: Mark Goodale, ‘The Misbegotten Monad’ in Danielle Celermajer and Alexandre Lefebvre (eds), The Subject of Human Rights (Stanford University Press 2020), available at https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503613720-004
For an African perspective on the foundations of human rights, see: Thaddeus Metz, ‘African Conceptions of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights’ (2012) 13 Human Rights Review 19, available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12142-011-0200-4
Should Animals Have Similar Rights to Humans?
For an argument that linking animal rights with human rights is incoherent, drawing on Derrida’s thought, see: Stella Gaon, ‘More than Life: Human Dignity and the Problem of Rights’ (2015) 48 Mosaic 77, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/44030408
For broad arguments in defence of maintaining human exceptionalism by denying animals rights, see: Nicholas H Lee, ‘In Defense of Humanity: Why Animals Cannot Possess Human Rights’ (2013) 26 Regent University Law Review 457, available at https://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/studentorgs/lawreview/docs/issues/v26n2/12_Lee_vol_26_2.pdf, David R Schmahmann and Lori J Polacheck, ‘The Case Against Animal Rights’ (1995) 22 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 747, available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71460332.pdf and Wesley J Smith, ‘Four Legs Good, Two Legs Bad’ (Human Exceptionalism, Discovery Institute, 15 December 2017), available at https://www.discovery.org/a/24811/
For a prominent exposition of human dignity as the ground of human rights, which excludes animals from consideration, see: Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity, Rank, and Rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley’ [2009] NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-50 1, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461220
For an argument that modern conceptions of human dignity are continuations of old hierarchical and potentially destructive ways of ordering society, see: James Q Whitman, ‘On Nazi “Honour” and The New European ‘Dignity’’ in Navraj Singh Ghaleigh and Christian Joerges (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Hart Publishing 2003), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472562753.ch-013
For a defence of rights based on sentience, which critiques approaches to rights based on species membership (‘old speciesism’) and human-like characteristics (‘new speciesism’), see: Joan Dunayer, ‘The Rights of Sentient Beings’ in Raymond Corbey and Annette Lanjouw (eds), The Politics of Species: Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals (Cambridge University Press 2013), available at https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139506755.005
For an argument that discriminatory attitudes to animals facilitate the same to humans, see: Atsuko Matsuoka and John Sorenson, ‘“Like an Animal” – Tropes for Delegitimization’ in Natalie Khazaal and Núria Almiron (eds), Like an Animal: Critical Animal Studies Approaches to Borders, Displacement, and Othering (Brill 2021), available at https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004440654_005
For a supporting argument in Spanish authored by the President of Ecuador’s Constitutional Assembly which enshrined the rights of nature (see Chapter 6) in Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution, see: Alberto Acosta, ‘Tienen Derechos Los Animales? (Do Animals Have Rights?)’ (La Insignia, 10 January 2008), available at https://www.lainsignia.org/2008/enero/cul_005.htm. To contextualise Acosta’s article, see: Mihnea Tanasescu, ‘The Rights of Nature in Ecuador: TheMaking of an Idea’ (2013) 70 International Journal of Environmental Studies 846 at 848-849, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/00207233.2013.845715
For an empirical study about shared values between human rights and animal rights, see: Carrie P Freeman, Pilot Study: Identifying Shared Values in Rights Declarations for Humans, Other Animals, and Nature; What Values Human rights Organizations Appeal To; What Values Animal Protection Organizations Appeal To; and Finding Common Ground among All Three Causes, The Human Animal Earthling Identity: Shared Values Unifying Human Rights, Animal Rights, and Environmental Movements (University of Georgia Press 2020), available at https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvxhrmr1
For arguments that all agents capable of goal-directed action—including humans and nonhuman animals—should have basic rights, drawing on Alan Gewirth’s thought, see: Evelyn B Pluhar, ‘Experimentation on Humansand Nonhumans’ (2006) 27 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 333, available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11017-006-9009-6 and Joshua Jowitt, ‘Legal Rights for Animals: Aspiration or Logical Necessity?’ (2020) 11 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 172, available at https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2020.02.02
How Could Human and Animal Rights Be Reconciled Legally?
For an in-depth consideration of proportionality reasoning in rights jurisprudence, see: Aharon Barak, ‘The Components of Proportionality’, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge University Press 2012), available at https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139035293
For a broad and critical reflection on the nature and application of proportionality reasoning in law, see: Francisco J Urbina, ‘Is it Really That Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and‘Balancing as Reasoning’’ (2015) 27(1) Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 167, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900006275
For an exposition on proportionality reasoning in Latin American jurisdictions, see: Laura Clérico, ‘Proportionality’ in Conrado Hübner Mendes, Roberto Gargarella and Sebastián Guidi (eds), The Oxford handbook of constitutional law in Latin America (First edition, Oxford University Press 2022), available at https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198786900.013.38
For an argument that Ronald Dworkin’s famous theory of rights as trumps is congruent with proportionality methodology, see: Kai Möller, ‘Dworkin’s Theory of Rights in the Age of Proportionality’ (2018) 12 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 281, available at https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2018-0011
For an argument that proportionality reasoning in law obscures the more important underlying moral problems and conflicts, see: Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mop011
For an argument that extreme cases of moral wrongs should not be governed by principled rules at all, see: Alon Harel and Assaf Sharon, ‘“Necessity Knows No Law”: On Extreme Cases and Uncodifiable Necessities’ (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 845, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/41429399
For an analysis of six approaches to conflicts of interest between humans and nonhumans, see: Elisa Aaltola, ‘Animal Ethics and Interest Conflicts’ (2005) 10 Ethics & the Environment 19, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/40339094
For critical reflections on the so-called incommensurability problem in rights-balancing—that qualitatively different goods are weighed against each other—see: Fancisco J Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 575, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqv015 and Timothy Endicott, ‘Proportionality and Incommensurability’ in Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller and Gregoire Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press 2014), available at https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107565272.019
For a discussion of the terms “minority,” “subordinate,” and “oppressed” groups, see David Nibert, ‘Minority Group as Sociological Euphemism’ (1996) 3 Race, Gender & Class 129, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/41675339. For an argument that animals are a minority group, see Edward Ludwig and Dale Jamieson, ‘Animals as a Minority’ (1981) 5 Humanity & Society 246, available at https://doi.org/10.1177/016059768100500304
Conclusion
For an argument about the significance of the animal-human relationships that underlie potential legal animal rights, see: Brian Favre, ‘Is There a Need for a New, an Ecological, Understanding of Legal Animal Rights?’ (2020) 11 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 297, available at https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2020.02.07
For a consideration of the tensions between animal rights and Indigenous rights, focused on the Canadian context, see: Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson, ‘Animal Rights and Aboriginal Rights’ in Vaughan Black, Peter J Sankoff and Katie Sykes (eds), Canadian perspectives on animals and the law (Irwin Law 2015), available at https://ca.vlex.com/vid/animal-rights-and-aboriginal-869278486
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